SPEEDING: Can a court just take judicial notice of a laser/radar devise?

The following is once again taken from State v. Kincaid, 124 Ohio Misc.2d 92, 2003-Ohio-4632. 

"In order for judicial notice to be taken, the fact must be one of common knowledge throughout the jurisdiction of the court." State v. Doles (1980), 70 Ohio App.2d 35, 24 O.O.3d 25, 433 N.E.2d 1290, paragraph one of syllabus. "In the absence of expert testimony in the present case, and in the absence of any expert testimony in a previous case before that court or a court of binding authority upon that court regarding the accuracy and dependability of the laser device, such fact is not of common knowledge within that jurisdiction and thus cannot be the subject of judicial notice." State v. Saphire (Dec. 8, 2000), 2d Dist. No. 2000 CA 39, 2000 WL 1803852, citing Columbus v. Dawson and Doles, supra.

Some courts have construed Evid.R. 201(B) to mean that unless the decision is reported, either by the trial court or a court of higher authority in that jurisdiction, "the dependability of such device is not of common knowledge within [the] jurisdiction and cannot be the subject of judicial notice. Doles, supra, at 38 [24 O.O.3d 25], 433 N.E.2d 1290. Accord State v. Farris (Mar. 26, 1985), Franklin App. No. 83AP-1214, unreported [1985 WL 9921]. Cf. State v. Ayesh (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 73, 74 [24 OBR 128], 493 N.E.2d 325 (the scientific reliability of K-55 radar has been authoritatively settled in the Twelfth Appellate District and is, therefore, a proper subject of judicial notice). Establishing for future cases the reliability of a particular laser device may be accomplished by means of a reported municipal court decision, as was done with radar in Akron v. Gray (1979), 60 Ohio Misc. 68 [14 O.O.3d 303, 397 N.E.2d 429], or by a reported or unreported case from this court, as was discussed in Doles, supra, at 38 [24 O.O.3d 25], 433 N.E.2d 1290, or by the Ohio Supreme Court, as was done in City of East Cleveland." Columbus v. Dawson (Mar. 14, 2000), 10th Dist. No. 99AP- 589, 2000 WL 271766.

It is the opinion of this court that requiring a "reported" case goes too far. Whether a case is reported is not always within the court's control. The court therefore holds that the filing of a journal entry setting forth the name of the specific device and covering each of the criteria set forth below satisfies the requirement that the "adjudicative facts" be "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" because they are generally known to the trier of fact in that court (1) that a qualified expert's testimony is received and accepted in open court, on the record and subject to cross-examination as to each speed-measuring device; (2) that the expert's testimony verifies that the underlying technology is based upon scientific principles accepted as dependable for the proposed purpose; (3) that the device itself is constructed based upon that technology and those principles; and (4) that the particular device was tested and is dependable and accurate.